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Abstract
This research is a critical analysis of criminal justice policy in Virginia, specifically, the
use of the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument (VPRAI), a computer application
designed to help judges make objective pretrial detention and release decisions. Although the
VPRAI was originally intended as a tool to further criminal justice reform in Virginia, there has
been very little independent inquiry into its use. My research gathers qualitative data through
interviews with professional stakeholders and former defendants to address this gap in
knowledge, and identify the benefits, consequences, and challenges associated with the VPRAI. I
conclude that, at the present time, it is not effectively contributing to reform efforts, and I
propose several policy modifications that could improve its use as a tool to eliminate cash bond,
lower incarceration rates, and produce unbiased pretrial detention decisions.
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Introduction
Federal and state criminal justice policies are undergoing a paradigm shift from a “tough
on crime” approach to a “smart on crime” approach in order to reform policies that have caused
American per capita incarceration rates to exceed those of all other nations (Sawyer & Wagner,
2019). This strategy seeks to safely reduce the practice of incarceration, which has become a
costly policy in both financial and social terms. Further, evidence demonstrates that the costs of
mass incarceration outweigh the benefits. In 2015, at the start of the federal government’s Smart
on Crime Initiative, then U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, acknowledged that, “wellintentioned policies designed to be ‘tough on crime’ have perpetuated a vicious cycle of
criminality and incarceration,” and that the “rise in incarceration is not only unsustainable—it
has not materially improved public safety, reduced crime, or strengthened communities” (Holder,
2015, 1). A “smart on crime” approach recognizes these consequences, and seeks to reform the
practices that contribute to ineffective, unfair, and unnecessary detentions. This new approach
strives to make more informed, fair, and accurate decisions using evidence-based strategies and
technologies.
One major objective of a “smart on crime” approach is to reform the practice of detaining
low-risk individuals before their trial. It is important to reform this practice because it
significantly contributes to mass incarceration in two ways. One, it adds to the pool of
incarcerated individuals at the front-end of the criminal justice process. Currently, over half a
million people, nation-wide, are detained before their trial (Sawyer & Wagner, 2019). Many of
them are low-risk, however they remain behind bars because they cannot afford to pay a cash
bond (Sawyer & Wagner, 2019). Two, the consequences associated with pretrial detention, such
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as job loss, can have reverberating effects, keeping criminal defendants in a cycle of criminality
and incarceration (Dobbie, Goldin &Yang, 2016).
Many criminal justice experts believe that adhering to the risk principle can safely reduce
the practice of pretrial detention. The risk principle asserts that sorting offenders into groups
based on their likelihood to re-offend and appear for trial will help officials use resources more
effectively, and preserve public safety. Risk sorting helps officials direct resources to those who
need it most, and limit intervention for those who need it least (Milgram, Holsinger,
VanNostrand & Alsdorf, 2015). The strategy most commonly used to help the criminal justice
system adhere to the risk principle at the pretrial stage is to replace subjective pretrial decisions
with data-driven recommendations produced though computer applications that sort defendants
by risk level (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2015). The rationale behind this “smart
on crime” practice is that pretrial incarceration rates can be lowered safely when only those who
are calculated to have a high-risk of flight or re-offense are detained (Milgram, Holsinger,
VanNostrand & Alsdorf, 2015).
Virginia realized the importance of pretrial reform, and began adhering to the risk
principle in 1989, when it incorporated pretrial reform into its “smart on crime” initiative to help
safely address jail overcrowding (Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, 2018b).
Virginia codified this reform effort through the Pretrial Services Act in 1995, which established
agencies that could help judicial officers make better informed pretrial detention decisions based
on a defendant’s risk (Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, 2018b). By 2005,
Virginia had become the first state to implement a state-wide computerized pretrial risk
assessment instrument to sort pretrial defendants based on risk (Virginia Department of Criminal
Justice Services, 2013).
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These computer applications, known as risk assessment instruments (RAIs), use an
algorithm to predict the likelihood that an individual will fail to appear at their trial, or will reoffend before trial. Many different RAIs are used across the nation, and while their algorithms
differ, all pretrial RAIs generate recommendations to either detain or release a criminal
defendant. At the pretrial stage, judges consider these recommendations when making bail or
bond decisions. The RAI algorithm weighs social factors and a defendant’s criminal history
against a historical dataset (Goel, Shroff, Skeem & Slobogin, 2018). The dataset is comprised of
statistics on prior criminal defendants’ actions and pretrial outcomes (Bechtel, Holsinger,
Lowenkamp &Warren, 2016). RAIs sort pretrial defendants into risk levels based on how a
criminal defendant’s factors match up to those of prior criminal defendants.
Although RAIs are frequently used nationwide in the pretrial process, they are not always
efficient, and they are criticized just as often as they are praised (Hannah-Moffat, 2015).
However, the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument (VPRAI) appears to be exempt from
such criticism, which is why it is the focus of this research. Literature on the VPRAI reflects that
there is an alarming imbalance between criticism and praise. Perhaps the criticism on the VPRAI
is scarce because there is a lack of independent inquiry. Indeed, the company who created the
instrument has produced much of the research literature concerning the VPRAI.
My research provides a valuable contribution by offering an independent source of
research on the VPRAI. I have gathered qualitative data through interviews with Virginia
criminal justice professionals, and documented, for the first time ever, the perspectives and
knowledge they have gained through their experience with the VPRAI. One interview actually
evolved into a courtroom observation, which allowed me to experience the use of the VPRAI
during bond hearings. I have also gathered qualitative data through interviews with former
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criminal defendants who were impacted by the VPRAI process, and I have included their
personal perspectives and experiences in my research—another first. The data from this second
interview group helps to ensure that the research is comprehensive and inclusive. As a whole,
this data identifies the benefits, challenges, and consequences associate with the VPRAI, and
allows me to assess its use and effectiveness.
I seek to answer the question of whether the VPRAI is an effective tool for furthering
criminal justice reform in Virginia, or whether it is a flawed instrument that is contributing to
pre-existing criminal justice problems. This question is difficult to answer when analyzed
through the lens of the literature currently available. I conclude that, at the present time, the
VPRAI is not effectively contributing to reform efforts, and I propose several policy
modifications that could improve the use of the VPRAI as a tool to lower incarceration rates,
eliminate cash bond, and produce unbiased pretrial detention decisions.

Literature Review
Benefits of RAIs
Risk assessment instruments (RAIs) have been touted by some criminal justice reformers
and policy makers as effective solutions for furthering criminal justice reform. As one proponent
put it, “It may seem weird to rely on an impersonal algorithm to predict a person’s behavior
given the enormous stakes. But the gravity of the outcome--in cost, crime, and wasted human
potential--is exactly why we should use an algorithm” (Neufeld, 2017, para. 9). Support for RAIs
comes from a wide range of criminal justice reformers including scholars, researchers, criminal
defense organizations, political leaders, and non-profit groups. The benefits they cite include
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increased community safety, their potential to replace the practice of cash bond, and their ability
to lower costly incarceration rates (Glazer, Sassaman &Wool, 2017; Herring, 2018; National
Association of State Legislatures, 2017; Neufeld, 2017).
Supporters of RAIs believe that their risk-based recommendations will improve the safety
of the community by correctly identifying high-risk individuals for detention, and properly
identifying low-risk individuals for release. The release of low-risk individuals improves public
safety because facts show that detaining lower-risk defendants, even for a few days, increases the
long and short-term likelihood of new criminal activity (Milgram, Holsinger, VanNostrand &
Alsdorf, 2015). In fact, New York City officials believe that their pretrial RAI use has allowed
them to safely decrease incarceration rates while also keeping their crime rates below the
national average (Glazer, Sassaman &Wool, 2017).
Additionally, RAI supporters also believe that these actuarial tools are a promising
replacement to the cash bond practice, which is viewed as an ineffective and unfair pretrial
detention policy (Herring, 2018). The Vera Institute for Justice asserts that the cash bond practice
drives disparity already present in the judicial system, and it should be eliminated by shifting to a
risk-based decision making practice (Glazer, Sassaman & Wool, 2017). When pretrial release is
based on one’s ability to pay, the people who are unable to pay for their freedom face “immense
pressure to plead guilty to crimes...” which results in judicial disparities for marginalized groups
(Legal Aid Justice Center, 2019, para. 7). Therefore, cash bond practices are believed to be
ineffective and unfair because they detain low-risk individuals merely because they are poor.
This unnecessarily adds to incarceration rates, and creates judicial disparities, particularly for
marginalized groups.
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A final argument in support of the use of pretrial RAIs is that they can help lower costly
incarceration rates. Research that supports this claim shows that some pretrial RAIs have helped
to reduce pretrial incarceration rates. For example, according to the National Association of
Public Defenders (2017), the pretrial RAI used in Washington D.C., in conjunction with reining
in the use of cash bonds, was instrumental in achieving a 90% pretrial release rate of arrestees in
2016 (National Association of Public Defenders, 2017). Additionally, the New York City
Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice states that NYC’s pretrial RAI use has allowed the city to
achieve “the lowest incarceration rate of any big city in the nation” (Glazer, Sassaman &Wool,
2017, para. 4). Further, New Jersey’s pretrial RAI implementation has also resulted in pretrial
releases being granted in 90% of cases in 2013 (National Association, 2017). Such large release
rates would indeed lower the pretrial detention burden on local jails, and in turn result in cost
savings, which is predicted by the Pretrial Justice Institute (2018) to average $74.61 per day for
each detainee.
Concerns with RAIs
On the other hand, some criminal justice reformers are wary of RAIs because some of the
factors considered in the risk calculations could serve as proxies for race, gender, or
socioeconomic status. Some RAI’s can elevate one’s risk score “on the basis of acuteness of
disadvantage, reinforce/mask racial and gender disparities, produce false positives, and lead to
less transparent decisions” (Hannah-Moffat, 2015, 224).
Concerning racial bias, critics of RAIs point out that, if the risk factors that serve as
proxies for crime, (such as factors concerning an individual’s criminal history, criminal justice
supervision, and pending charges), are weighed by an algorithm in equal proportion for all races,
then they could exacerbate racial bias already present in the criminal justice system (Glazer,
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Sassaman & Wool, 2017). This is because people of color are “disproportionately policed, and
are more likely to be charged by prosecutors and forced into pleas that result in convictions”
(Glazer, Sassaman & Wool, 2017, para. 5). As a result, it is thought that, using criminal history
data to measure risk will exacerbate existing racial disparities in the criminal justice system, and
have a continuing “ratchet effect” on this profiled population because risk calculations are
heavily determined by criminal history, which can serve as a proxy for race (Harcourt, 2015,
237). Other scholars note that, while criminal history is a strong re-offense predictor for all
races, its inclusion in a RAI presents a “conundrum,” because, even if predictive bias can be
ruled out, there is still the question of its perceived or actual disparate impact (Skeem &
Lowenkamp 2016, 34).
Additionally, RAI critics are concerned that some RAIs do not properly measure the risk
of two other vulnerable groups--lower-income individuals and women. Their concern stems from
the fact that some RAIs measure risk with factors that include employment status, which could
negatively affect individuals that are in a lower socioeconomic bracket (Starr, 2015). Further,
many RAIs do not consider mitigating risk factors at all, which are thought to be particularly
important when calculating a woman’s risk level (McCoy & Miller, 2013). The general concern
is that because of the way RAIs measure risk and omit mitigating factors, these two groups will
be assigned into a higher risk level, and be detain by data that cannot accurately measure their
true risk. Legal scholar Sonja Starr (2015) asserts that it is wrong to use socioeconomic factors,
such as employment status, in risk calculations because individuals ought to be considered by
their individual risk, rather than assigned risk points because they belong to a socioeconomic
group that is generalized as having a higher flight or re-offense risk. Starr (2015) argues that
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neither a judge, nor policymaker, would support detention based on poverty; therefore, they
should not support RAIs that consider this factor.
Further, when it comes to calculating a woman’s risk, researchers found that risk
calculations should be different because some factors were better predictors for men, while
others were better predictors for women. For example, substance abuse factors were determined
to only be good predictors for men, while factors of positive social support significantly
predicted recidivism risk accurately for women (McCoy & Miller, 2013). Another group of
researchers concluded that gender-specific risk assessments could better predict risk for women
because gender-neutral risk calculations can overestimate a woman’s risk. They highlighted the
example of a pretrial RAI used in Florida, COMPAS, which uses gender-neutral data to calculate
risk, and was discovered to be incorrectly assigning women into a higher risk level (Goel, Shroff,
Skeem & Slobogin, 2018).
Perhaps settling the argument on whether RAIs can produce fair outcomes for all groups
of people is a study by Kleinberg, Mullainathan and Raghavan (2016). These researchers first
defined three different ways in which to measure the “fairness” of a RAI. Then, they developed a
theorem to test if it was possible for a RAI to achieve all three aspects of fairness. They proved
that “except in highly constrained special cases, there is no method that can satisfy these three
conditions simultaneously” (Kleinberg et al., 2016, 1-5). Kleinberg et al. (2016) determined that
it is highly unlikely that a RAI can produce completely fair predictions because base rates differ
among different groups of people.
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The Need for Transparency, Independent Inquiry, and Caution
Proponents and opponents alike stress the need for RAI transparency, for independent
validation of these tools, and the need to exercise caution when it comes to how much emphasis
is placed on data. Research by legal scholar Hannah-Moffat (2015) legitimizes these concerns.
She found that in general all RAIs are similar to Pandora’s Box. They are poorly understood by
policymakers and the practitioners who use them. She found that even developers of RAIs
question their accuracy.
When a RAI lacks transparency its outcomes will be viewed with skepticism, and its use
will weaken confidence in the judicial system (Goel, Shroff, Skeem & Slobogin, 2018). A study
conducted by researchers from ProPublica (2016) on the pretrial RAI, COMPAS, called attention
to the fact that, without transparency and independent validation, researchers and the public will
question a RAI’s rightful use in the judicial system. These researchers examined Florida’s use of
COMPAS, and found that it was producing racially biased pretrial release recommendations.
African Americans were twice as likely to be incorrectly assigned to a higher risk category than
were whites, while whites were more often miscalculated to be low-risk. A statistical test
determined that the racial difference was not attributed to differences in the defendants’ prior
crimes or the type of crimes they were arrested for. When trying to pinpoint what was causing
the racial disparity the researchers hit a wall. Northpointe, the for-profit software company that
developed COMPAS, would not share the specific calculations used by the algorithm to assess
nearly two-dozen risk factors. Northpointe claimed the algorithm was its intellectual property
(Angwin, Larson, Mattu & Kirchner, 2016). ProPublica was never able to determine the reason
for its racial discrepancy, and COMPAS remains a widely criticized pretrial RAI because it lacks
transparency (Spielkamp, 2017).
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Literature on certain RAIs show that these instruments can be developed and validated in
a manner that make them more transparent and trusted. For example, the Indiana risk assessment
tool named IPAS is a university-developed and validated tool, which gives it a higher degree of
credence than a RAI developed by a for-profit company. IPAS also published its scoring guide
and pretrial interview procedures (Latessa, Lovins & Makarios, 2013; University of Cincinnati,
2010). Additionally, a RAI developed by the Laura and John Arnold Foundation, called the
PSA, has been praised a great deal for its transparency and independent validation. The PSA is
not only developed by a non-profit, and open about how it calculates risk, but it also requested
that experts at Harvard Law School study its effectiveness (Access to Justice, 2018). In
summary, non-profit development, independent validation, and procedural transparency can
increase confidence in the use of RAIs.
Still, scholars caution that “law is not math,” and that policy makers and judicial officers
often fail to question the use of, or outcomes produced by, risk assessment algorithms (Kahn,
2018, 190). At least one data scientist has cautioned that widely-used algorithms are capable of
producing biased outcomes, and can result in damage to whole groups of people. This requires
stakeholders to carefully consider how much emphasis should be placed on these “weapons of
math destruction” (O’Neil, 2016, 3).
Further, Starr (2015) cautions that the “debate over risk assessments has played down the
factors that the assessments rely on, employing feel-good euphemisms like ‘evidence-based
sentencing’” (Starr, 2015, 235). One study confirms Starr’s assertion. Researchers conducted an
exhaustive search for research on pretrial risk assessments, and found that there is a “distinct lack
of research that utilizes any amount of methodological rigor” (Bechtel, Holsinger, Lowenkamp
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& Warren, 2016, 1). This study suggests that, overall, RAIs are being implemented without
much inquiry, and accepted without critical thought.
Finally, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (2018) cautions us to consider how much
weight is placed on RAIs. This technology-focused watchdog group points out that RAIs reduce
people to the sum of their data, and ignore their humanity. This concern, combined with the
aforementioned concerns, draws attention to several reasons why we should exercise caution
before implementing a tool that detains people based on data.
The VPRAI and the Pretrial Process
According to the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS), the VPRAI is
a computer application that was implemented in 2005, and is currently used by the majority of
cities and counties in Virginia (Rose, 2016; Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services,
2018b). Virginia has 33 separate pretrial services agencies that use the VPRAI to “assess risk of
flight and danger to the community posed by pretrial defendants” (Virginia Department of
Criminal Justice Services, 2013, 7). The VPRAI is an actuarial risk assessment that uses a
mathematical model to sort pretrial defendants into risk categories by weighing facts about a
detained pretrial defendant against data gathered in the 1990s on the actions and outcomes of
former Virginia defendants (Rose, 2016).
It is important to understand where the VPRAI fits into the pretrial process, which is the
judicial stage between an arrest and trial. During this time period, the accused can be detained in
jail if a judicial officer determines that the accused presents a flight risk before trial, or there is
reason to believe the accused could pose a danger to the community if released. The pretrial
process in Virginia is as follows (see Table 1, on page 48, for visual depiction). The process

13

begins after arrest. In most cases, the arresting officer takes the defendant to a magistrate, where
an initial bail decision is made without using the VPRAI. If the magistrate decides to detain the
defendant, the officer will take the defendant to jail, where he will wait to have his bail
reconsidered during a bond hearing (Department of Magistrate Services, 2018). While the
defendant is in jail waiting for his bond hearing, a pretrial services officer will conduct an initial
assessment of the defendant to determine whether the current charges make him eligible for a
pretrial risk assessment. If eligible, the detained defendant will be asked a series of questions
related to his employment, caregiver, student status, pending charges, drug use, and criminal
history (Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, 2018a). Next, the pretrial officer will
input facts about the defendant and the defendant’s answers into the VPRAI software, which will
generate a risk score. From this risk score, a recommendation to continue with pretrial detention
or release is calculated by a portion of the VPRAI called the Praxis. If the recommendation is to
release, the Praxis will include the terms of release that should be imposed to mitigate the risk of
flight and re-offense (Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, 2018a). Later, at the
defendant’s bond hearing the judge will look over the VPRAI report, which contains the
defendant’s risk score, criminal background information, the pretrial officer’s notes, and Praxis
recommendation. Finally, the judge will consider the risk assessment recommendation in his
decision to release the defendant (Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, 2018a).
Benefits associated with the VPRAI
It is important to note that the Praxis recommendation to release often comes with nonmonetary conditions attached to increase the likelihood that a pretrial defendant will show up for
his court date, and remain on good behavior. Some of the conditions Praxis may recommend are:
court date reminders; criminal history checks while on release; face-to-face check-ins with
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pretrial services officers; and drug testing (Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services,
2018a). According to the most recent statewide data, these risk mitigating interventions may be
the reason why pretrial defendants that have been released, and have received some level of
pretrial supervision between 2015 and 2018, appeared for court dates approximately 95% of the
time, remained on good behavior 94% of the time, and complied with all pretrial requirements
about 88% of the time (Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, 2018b). While these
percentages seem to imply that Praxis’ non-monetary release conditions are beneficial, a
comparison cannot be made between those given pretrial services and those who have not
because outcomes for those who have not are not tracked (Virginia State Crime Commission,
2018).
However, the pretrial success rates do point out that the VPRAI’s most beneficial
component could be its Praxis risk-mitigating recommendations, which impose some level of
pretrial supervision for released defendants. For the time being, these are not only the most
promising statistics on the outcomes produced by the VPRAI--they are also the only statistics
available on the impact of the VPRAI on pretrial release outcomes for bailable defendants. The
DCJS stated in their most recent report that no statistics on the VPRAI’s release rates are
available at this time, but that these figures were being gathered, and would be forthcoming
(Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, 2018b). Additionally, the Virginia Crime
Commission is currently in the middle of a pretrial inquiry that seeks to provide more data on
pretrial outcomes (Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, 2018b). Therefore, while
the Praxis release recommendation is the only component of the VPRAI that has been
statistically shown to be beneficial, forthcoming statistics may reveal other beneficial aspects
such as improved release rates and lower use of cash bonds.
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Another possible benefit, though not yet realized, is that the VPRAI offers a method to
move away from cash bond practices because it emphasizes that release decisions should be
based on risk, and it never recommends the use of cash bonds. Virginia criminal justice
professionals are supportive of this potential benefit. Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring
has expressed the need for alternatives to cash bonds, “I want to keep dangerous people in jail
and I want people to show up for court, and it’s clear that there are better, more effective ways to
achieve that. It doesn’t make much sense, nor does it make our communities safer, to make a
low-risk, non-violent person sit in jail, while more violent or dangerous people can go free
because of their wealth” (Herring, 2018, para. 3). Additionally, a statement from the Virginia
Department of Criminal Justice Services also expresses the belief that an RAI could help
eliminate cash bond. The statement declared that the VPRAI’s objective and risk-based
recommendations could help usher in a “new norm” for pretrial policy in Virginia that would
include a shift away from the use of cash bonds in order to reduce unnecessary pretrial detention
(Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, 2013, 4). However, the VPRAI has not
actually been used to eliminate the use of cash bond. In fact, almost 60% of those who are
released before trial, and receive Praxis recommended pretrial services, must also pay a cash
bond (Virginia State Crime Commission, 2019). If Praxis recommendations were embraced as
intended--without the addition of cash bonds--then the VPRAI would be a beneficial tool to
eliminate the detention of indigent defendants, and ensure that high-risk defendants were not
released merely because they had financial resources.
Concerns with the use of the VPRAI
There is a concern with how well the VPRAI measures risk for minorities. A 2016 study
by its developer, Luminosity, found that there is “a difference in the predictive ability of the
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VPRAI risk factors for People of Color and for Whites, with the model preforming better for
Whites” (Danner, VanNostrand & Spruance, 2016, 8). Two factors in particular were determine
to be a poor measure of risk for people of color because it over-classified their pretrial risk. The
first was two or more violent convictions, and the second was the duration of the individual’s
residency. Additionally, the validation study found that the VPRAI over-classified pretrial failure
risk for women when it assigned weight to one factor concerning duration of residency and
another factor considering two or more violent convictions (Danner, VanNostrand & Spruance,
2016).
Another thing that is concerning is that, despite these findings, the study reached a final
conclusion that the VPRAI produced race and gender-neutral results. Luminosity reasoned that
when all of the VPRAI’s factors were weighed, summed, and collapsed into risk categories, the
risk classifications became race and gender-neutral (Danner, VanNostrand & Spruance, 2016).
This conclusion is concerning because it is the only race and gender-neutral study available, but
may be considered biased because Luminosity has a vested interest in the VPRAI’s performance.
Criminal justice professionals that believe this study is proof the tool produces unbiased results,
are putting their faith in a potentially skewed conclusion.
Method
Despite its widespread use in the Commonwealth, very little is known about the
effectiveness of the VPRAI. Its risk assessment data bank is inaccessible to outside researchers,
which makes it impossible to conduct an independent validation study. Further, its utility has
only been assessed, in whole or in part, by the for-profit company that created it, which requires
independent researchers to approach literature on the VPRAI with a good measure of skepticism.
Therefore, in order to undertake a scholarly analysis of the VPRAI, I collected qualitative data
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through interviews with professional stakeholders, and former criminal defendants who have
experienced the use of the VPRAI by one of Virginia’s pretrial services agencies, specifically the
Rappahannock Regional Jail Pretrial Services Agency. Speaking directly with practitioners who
use the form, as well as individuals who have had the form used in their criminal proceedings,
provides an important opportunity to consider firsthand how well the VPRAI works in assessing
the risk of both individual criminal defendants but also more broadly in terms of its overall use
as a pretrial assessment tool intended to further criminal justice reform efforts. Finally, one of
my professional stakeholder interviews actually evolved into a court room observation, which
allowed me to experience the VPRAI being used during bond hearings. I recorded my
observations and they are conveyed below.
This Fenno-inspired (1978) research method of participant observation and elite
interviews was approved by the University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) under the
expedited review process. Approved research on human subjects, a vital component of my thesis,
required that I amend my original plan regarding who was included as research subjects. In order
to qualify for the expedited approval process I had to omit from my research any defendants
whose cases had not been fully adjudicated by the courts because they are considered a
particularly vulnerable population. Additionally, for IRB approval the interviews with the former
defendant group had to be conducted face-to-face in order to ensure the interview was conducted
in a confidential manner, and to verify each participant’s identity as a former defendant whose
case had been fully adjudicated. Finally, in order to gain IRB approval I had to provide
participants in the professional stakeholder group with the option to participate confidentially.
This confidentiality restriction also required the interviews to be offered in a face-to-face format.
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Interviews with Professional Stakeholders
I conducted interviews with eight criminal justice stakeholders whose work involves, or
is impacted by, the VPRAI. Additionally, one interview included an observation of how the
VPRAI is used during a bond hearing. All eight professionals were selected based on their
willingness to be interviewed, and relay their professional experiences with the VPRAI as used
by the Rappahannock Regional Jail Pretrial Services Agency. My research focuses on
experiences related to just one of Virginia’s pretrial services agencies because each of the 33
pretrial agencies have nuanced differences. The composition of these eight professionals are as
follows: one judge from Stafford County; one prosecutor from Stafford County; two pretrial
services officials from the Rappahannock Regional Pretrial Services Agency; two defense
attorneys who represent indigent and non-indigent defendants; one local elected official (a
Virginia delegate), who is also a public defender; and finally, one official from the Virginia
Department of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS). (Detailed information on these interviewees are
included in the appendix, see page 55.)
Each of these professional interviewees were asked the same set of questions in order to
compare their answers. (These interview questions are included in the appendix, see page 56-57.)
These questions were designed to develop an understanding of how the VPRAI impacts the work
of each professional, and to capture their concerns and opinions on its use. Questions also probed
whether these individuals believed the factors used by the VPRAI were a good measure of risk,
and how we might improve the VPRAI overall. After the interviews, I analyzed the answers and
identified emerging themes. Next, I used a table to sort answers among three major themes:
challenges; consequences; and benefits. See Table 2, on page 49-51, for a speedy review of these
themes.
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Bond Hearing Observation
One interview was unique because it evolved into a courtroom observation, which
allowed me to experience the VPRAI being used during bond hearings. After interviewing the
prosecutor, I was invited to sit beside him during a series of bond hearings (about six in total),
which allowed me to experience how the prosecutor and judge use the VPRAI’s pretrial report to
determine whether a detained pretrial defendant should be released, and if so, on what terms. As
the bond hearings proceeded, the prosecutor showed me each defendant’s pretrial report, which
included the risk score and Praxis recommendations. I listened as the judge and prosecutor
reflected on the reports and wove the information contained in them into their prosecutorial
recommendations and judicial decisions. After the bond hearings were over, I recorded my
observations.
Interviews with Former Criminal Defendants
Next, in order to gain insight into how the VPRAI and Praxis are implemented, and to
identify any patterns that emerge with their use, I conducted confidential, in-person, interviews
with non-incarcerated former defendants. These former defendants have been detained pretrial at
the Rappahannock Regional Jail (RRJ) and had a pretrial risk assessment conducted by the RRJ
Pretrial Services Agency. Because the actual risk assessment scores and pretrial
recommendations are not available to the public, I asked this interview group questions that
allowed me to recreate their original risk assessment scores, pretrial recommendations, and
outcomes. (These interview questions are included in the appendix, see pages 58-61.) These
interviews allowed me to gain insight into who gets labeled high-risk, and under what
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circumstances someone would get labeled as low-risk. I was also able to determine if the judge
followed the Praxis recommendation to release or detain. Further, by interviewing this group I
was able to collect evidence on whether the use of the VPRAI has helped further criminal justice
reform efforts in Virginia. Finally, I was able to gather data on the social and economic impact
associated with pretrial detention for defendants, as well as the impact on their families.
Due to the restrictive face-to-face interview method necessary to obtain institutional
review board approval, only six former defendants agreed to meet for an interview. Of those six,
only five were qualified to participate after a criminal history inquiry revealed that one former
defendant had not actually been detained before trial, and therefore the VPRAI would never have
been used to asses this individual’s risk level. This small group of former criminal defendants are
not a representative sample of the whole group, but the offenses with which they were charged
are typical criminal offenses and interviews with this small group do allow for some insight into
the outcomes produced by the VPRAI.
After collecting the former defendants’ responses, I was able to replicate their pretrial
risk assessment recommendation by using portions of the VPRAI Instructional Manual that I
obtained from the DCJS website. (See Tables 3-5, on pages 52-53, for a visualization of the risk
calculation procedure.) It was important to replicate this data because the actual risk scores and
Praxis recommendations are off limits to researchers, and were not provided to any of the former
defendants I interviewed. Therefore, I had to replicate this data in order to learn what each
former defendant’s risk level and Praxis recommendation would have been. The replicated
Praxis recommendations, combined with the knowledge I gained during the interview on the
actual outcome of each former defendant’s pretrial detention, allowed me to determine, for each
former defendant, whether the judge followed the recommendation to release or detain. It is
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worth noting that this calculation would typically be done through the VPRAI computer
software, but this is inaccessible to outside researchers. However, despite the different method,
the algorithm used is exactly the same; therefore, the risk calculation should be the same.
My calculations began just like a pretrial services officer’s, by matching each defendant’s
answers on the interview form to the VPRAI risk factors listed on Table 3 (page 52), and tallying
up the points. Then, I matched each defendant’s total score with the corresponding risk level
listed on Table 4 (page 52). Finally, I correlated the risk level with the manual Praxis chart,
shown on Table 5 (page 53).
After calculating each former defendant’s risk level according to the method listed in the
manual, I combined the score and other findings on Table 6 (page 54), for easy analysis. The
findings were grouped under the headings of: risk score; released before trial; the VPRAI and
Praxis recommendation was followed; the defendant recalls answering the pretrial questions;
cash bond or pretrial services was a condition of the defendant’s release; the number of days
detained before trial; and the hardships the defendant or their family experienced as a result of
pretrial detention.
Findings
Professional Stakeholders
There was a general agreement among professional stakeholders --the judge, prosecutor,
defense attorneys, public defender, DCJS official, and pretrial services officers-- that the VPRAI
is helpful to their work. (For a summary of these findings see Table 2, column two, on pages 4951.) Those who work with pretrial defendants mentioned that the VPRAI’s pretrial report gives
them a convenient and condensed summary of a pretrial defendant’s history. For example, the
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judge cited that the pretrial report is helpful to him because it condenses a large amount of
important information he must consider for each bond hearing. The judge also viewed the
pretrial report as helpful because he considered it to be a recommendation from a neutral party.
Likewise, the prosecutor mentioned that the pretrial report’s summary of a defendant’s risk
factors and criminal history was useful for him to consider when making his bond
recommendations to the judge. Both defense attorneys said the pretrial report was helpful to their
work because it allowed them to learn their client’s history, and see what the judge and
prosecutor would consider for their client’s release. The Virginia delegate and public defender
mentioned that the VPRAI helps stakeholders make safer release decisions based on risk.
Even those who do not work directly with pretrial defendants said that the VPRAI was a
helpful tool. For example, the DCJS official mentioned that the VPRAI helps him in his work
because one of his duties is to ensure that pretrial services’ resources are used wisely, and the
VPRAI helps to identify the high-risk defendants who need pretrial resources and the low-risk
defendants who do not. Finally, both the pretrial officers stated that the VPRAI helps them to
objectively calculate a defendant’s risk in order to make an evidence-based release
recommendation that is free of subjectivity and personal bias.
Additionally, as shown on Table 2 (pages 49 - 51), column six, all professional
stakeholders said they support the use of the VPRAI. This is likely attributed to a belief that the
benefits associated with the VPRAI outweigh its risks. There is a significant difference between
the multitude of benefits listed in column two, and the lack of concern that the tool could result
in the biased outcomes listed in column seven. Further, column four highlights what each
member of this group identified as consequences related to the VPRAI, and many of these
consequences are positive. For example, the judge mentioned that the VPRAI has made pretrial
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services better at assessing defendants. And, one pretrial officer believed a consequence of the
VPRAI was that it helped low-risk defendants avoid detention, and thus lowered their risk for
recidivism and the likelihood that they would plead guilty out of desperation. The professional
stakeholders that I interviewed all support the use of the VPRAI, and this is most likely because
they identify many ways in which it is beneficial to defendants and criminal justice
professionals; they identify only a few concerns over how its use could result in bias outcomes or
negative consequences.
Several stakeholders also noted that the VPRAI risk scores and Praxis recommendations
do not actually dictate pretrial outcomes. These stakeholders pointed out that pretrial officers can
override Praxis recommendations, and that judges make the final release decisions. (These
findings are contained in columns two and three of Table 2, pages 49-51.) For example, the
public defender mentioned that in her experience pretrial officers do not consistently follow the
Praxis recommendations because they are permitted to use their discretion, and can override the
computer’s recommendation as they see fit. Both pretrial officers corroborated her claim, and
explained that they may occasionally change the release recommendation when Praxis is unable
to consider mitigating and aggravating factors, such as forthcoming charges or forthcoming
employment.
Additionally, defense attorney #1 mentioned that in her experience judges often override
Praxis release recommendations as judicial discretion permits them to do so. The judge also
acknowledged that the VPRAI’s pretrial report was a helpful component in his release decisions
because it was a neutral source of information, but he never stated that the Praxis
recommendation controlled his decision. He reasoned that a judge must be mindful of unwise
release recommendations. The prosecutor conveyed that he supports the use of the VPRAI as a
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component of the release decision but that ultimately it must aid bond decisions, not control
them. The prosecutor also mentioned that, while the computerized release recommendation can
be helpful, human discretion is still needed. These findings are important because they
demonstrate that the VPRAI is used to help guide pretrial release recommendations and
decisions, and that despite their use, professional stakeholders still exercise their professional
discretion.
Some stakeholders I interviewed reflected on how cooperation and communication
among professional stakeholders is important because it helps establish confidence in the use of
the VPRAI. For example, as shown in columns three and four of Table 2, both the judge and
prosecutor mentioned that it was important to have a good working relationship with pretrial
services officers in order to establish confidence in their pretrial release recommendations. The
prosecutor stated that in his experience the quality and resources of each pretrial agency is
different, and that getting to know the pretrial officers who conduct the VPRAI assessments and
issue the release recommendations helps build his confidence in their ability to produce a sound
recommendation.
Additionally, pretrial officer #2 mentioned that cooperation with professional
stakeholders whose work does not entail the direct application of the VPRAI is also important to
instill overall confidence in its use. He cited that there is a lack of cooperation between
stakeholders whose daily work involves the VPRAI and professional stakeholders with the
Virginia Crime Commission whose job includes studying criminal justice policies like the
VPRAI. This lack of communication results in the Commission having a poor understanding of
the VPRAI, which in turn limits their ability to establish confidence in its use. In summary,
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findings show that good cooperation among professional stakeholders is necessary to build
confidence in the use of the VPRAI.
Another finding is that the VPRAI helps to manage criminal justice resources.
Interviewees mentioned this was beneficial to both professional stakeholders and to defendants.
For professionals, the VPRAI separates high-risk defendants from low-risk defendants, and the
Praxis recommends which pretrial services are necessary to mitigate a defendant’s flight risk or
likelihood he re-offends. The DCJS official noted that this allows pretrial services—such as
check-ins, trial reminders, electronic monitoring, and drug testing--to be precisely targeted to the
high-risk individuals who need them the most, and be omitted for the low-risk defendants, which
saves resources. Additionally, the public defender mentioned that carefully prescribed Praxis
release conditions are beneficial to defendants because just the right amount of pretrial
supervision helps released defendants return to court and remain on good behavior. The DCJS
official likewise mentioned research shows that giving just the right amount of pretrial restriction
is important because too much can hinder a pretrial defendant’s success. It seems that the
VPRAI’s ability to sort defendant’s by risk level allows for resources to be used in the most
effective and beneficial manner.
Interview responses also revealed several challenges associated with the VPRAI’s use.
One challenge is that there is a lack of knowledge on how the VPRAI works—or even how well
it works. For example, defense attorney #2 pointed out that many attorneys lack a full
understanding of how the VPRAI calculates and reports risk. While he finds pretrial reports to be
a helpful summary of his client’s history, he is confused by the numerical risk levels listed on the
reports, and does not understand how the risk levels are assigned, or what they mean for his
client. The DCJS official also mentioned that professional education should be offered to all
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professional stakeholders. Pretrial officer #1 offered a different take on who needs more
education on the VPRAI--he mentioned that there should be a greater effort to make constituents
aware of its use. Finally, as shown on column five of Table 2, half of the interviewees in this
group expressed the need for more inquiry into the use of the VPRAI, so that its use can be
improved and better understood. These findings highlight the need for professional VPRAI
training, and for more literature to be published on its use and effectiveness.
A second challenge associated with the use of the VPRAI was identified when two
interviewees expressed frustration that pretrial detentions often begin at the magistrate level,
where the VPRAI is not used. Defense attorney #1 mentioned that it is often the magistrate who
makes the initial pretrial detention decisions, and these initial decisions are made before the
VPRAI assessment begins. Additionally, the public defender added that these initial detention
decisions often come with excessive cash bonds that are difficult for defendants and attorneys to
overcome. These findings suggest that the VPRAI may be more useful if the magistrates used it
early on in the pretrial process.
The professional stakeholders interviewed also suggested three ways to improve the
factors used to calculate risk. They believed the VPRAI risk factors should be modified to:
include mitigating factors; differentiate between the severities of crimes; and more accurately
weigh the dangers posed by those arrested for DUIs, drug offenses, and domestic abuse. (These
findings are contained in column five of Table 2, pages 49-51).
Including mitigating factors into the algorithm would help produce a more accurate
measure of an individual’s risk. For example, defense attorney #1 suggested that substance abuse
treatment history should be included as a mitigating factor because it would likely mitigate any
drug abuse history that the VPRAI currently considers an elevated risk factor. The public
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defender also mentioned that the VPRAI should consider mitigating factors such as a defendant’s
community ties, which lowers flight risk, in order to produce a more accurate measure of risk.
The prosecutor, both attorneys, and the public defender all mentioned in their interviews
that the VPRAI should differentiate between the severities of crimes in order to make a more
precise determination of a defendant’s risk to the community. For example, defense attorney #2
suggested that the VPRAI should weigh different types of violent crimes differently, and risk
should be assigned according to their severity. Similarly, the DCJS official suggested that
domestic violence should be considered uniquely when factoring in the risk a defendant poses to
the community. Defense attorney #1 further suggested that a defendant accused of a property
crime should be considered less of a risk to public safety than if he were convicted of a violent
crime.
Additionally, the VPRAI should more accurately weigh the dangers posed by those
arrested for DUIs and drug offenses. For example, the judge and defense attorney #2 were both
concerned that, when it comes to “hard” drug charges, the VPRAI does not take into account the
risk an individual poses to themselves; instead, it often recommends release without adequate
pretrial services. Similarly, when it comes to DUI charges, the prosecutor was concerned that the
VPRAI does not adequately consider the danger an individual poses to themselves or the
community, and it often recommends release without adequate pretrial services. Pretrial officer
#2 highlighted that this problem is attributed to the VPRAI being poorly designed to weigh drug
use differently, depending on the type of drug and the risk associated with its use.
The interviewees suggested that the aforementioned modifications be made to the VPRAI
because they believe that these changes would help the VPRAI measure a defendant’s risk more
accurately. These findings demonstrate that professional stakeholders have many suggestions on
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how to improve the VPRAI. The significance of this is that, while professional stakeholders are
not data scientists or software developers, they do have good ideas regarding how to improve the
factors that are considered in the algorithm.
One final significant finding is that only one interviewee from this group expressed
specific concerns that the VPRAI could produce biased outcomes. The public defender
mentioned that she was concerned that there could be an increase in the likelihood of pretrial
detention for minorities due to over-policing in minority communities. This is a concern because
the VPRAI increases a defendant’s level of risk based on their criminal history, which could be
more substantial for someone living in a community that is policed more frequently. The fact that
only one interviewee was concerned by this highlights the need for independent literature on the
VPRAI that points out why professional stakeholders should be mindful to the possibility that
even data-driven risk assessments can produce biased outcomes.
Bond Hearing Observations
As I sat beside the prosecutor during the bond hearings, I made some observations about
the pretrial report, which is a document produced by the VPRAI, and is used during a bond
hearing. First, a pretrial report is made up of a few sheets of paper. The first sheet includes:
identifying information on a defendant; a convenient summary of a defendant’s charges; his risk
factors; a detention recommendation based on his risk level; recommended conditions for his
release; and noteworthy mitigating or aggravating factors that the VPRAI wasn’t designed to
consider. The other pages contain a summary of the defendant’s criminal history. Another thing I
noticed about the pretrial report is that the defendant’s race is reported in the upper right-hand
corner. A final observation about the report is that under the release or detention
recommendation is a sentence that conveys whether the recommendation is consistent with the
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Praxis recommendation, or whether the pretrial officer overrode the Praxis recommendation.
These findings suggest that, while the VPRAI’s pretrial report provides a convenient and
objective summary of a defendant’s risk factors and criminal history, it also may introduce
subjectivity into the release decision in two ways. First, it allows a pretrial officer to override the
objective Praxis recommendation; second, it subconsciously suggests that a defendant’s race
might warrant inclusion into a release decision by prominently noting a defendant’s race on the
form.
I also noticed the way in which the pretrial report was used and by whom. The judge and
prosecutor both had copies of each defendant’s pretrial report, and discussed the information it
contained with each other. There was a pretrial services officer present at the bond hearings to
answer questions about the pretrial reports, but he was never asked any questions. Additionally,
all defendants appeared at the bond hearing through video conferencing because they were
currently detained in jail. None of them had a copy of their pretrial report. Interestingly, no
defense attorneys were present at the bond hearings. This suggests that the pretrial report is more
beneficial to the judge and prosecutor, and not readily available to incarcerated defendants. It
also suggests that the pretrial report is not often reviewed or objected to by legal counsel or
pretrial defendants.
I also observed the way the prosecutor used the report to present his bond
recommendation to the judge. In some cases, the prosecutor verbalized his disagreement with the
pretrial report’s recommendation. In one case, the prosecutor pointed out that the magistrate
should never have detained the person in the first place. In another case, the prosecutor pointed
out that the defendant had been charged while he was detained for a different offense, and so he
would remain incarcerated regardless of a decision to release. Yet in another case, the prosecutor
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made note that the person was a registered sex offender, and argued that factor should be
considered in the release decision. These observations suggest that the prosecutor does not
always have confidence in the Praxis recommendations.
Finally, I observed the way the judge used the report to make his release decision. It
appeared as though the judge had a process for making his pretrial decisions. Although the judge
often followed the pretrial report’s recommendation, he did so after three noticeable steps. First,
he considered the pretrial report recommendation. Then, he listened to the prosecutor’s
recommendation. After processing both sources of information, he weighed in with his own
judicial wisdom. This sequence suggests that the judge uses the pretrial report to augment his
release decision, rather than control it.
Results from Interviews with Former Defendants
Interviews with former defendants revealed important pretrial detention findings. As
shown in column eight on Table 6 (page 54), all former defendants in this interview group spent
at least one day in jail, even though all but one of them were eventually granted pretrial release
by a judge at their bond hearing, and a Praxis recommendation determined that detention was not
necessary. This finding shows that the VPRAI is not being used early enough in the pretrial
process; and as a result, defendants are being unnecessarily detained pretrial. If the VPRAI had
been used by the magistrate for the initial detention decision, then the he would have received
the Praxis recommendation showing that detention was not necessary, and these defendants
would likely not have been detained at all.
Additionally, these interviews revealed important findings concerning the use of cash
bond. As shown in column six of Table 6, those who were granted release all reported that a cash
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bond was required. This is important because it shows cash bond is being frequently imposed,
and that it is imposed on both low and high-risk defendants. In fact, column two on Table 6
shows that three of the defendants received a risk score of zero--the lowest possible score--yet, in
order to be released, they had to post a cash bond. The use of cash bonds for low-risk defendants
is particularly concerning because it can result in the unnecessary detention of a low-risk
individual based on his meager financial resources.
Interviews with former defendants also revealed that even short-term pretrial detentions
can create hardships. As shown in column eight of Table 2, all interviewees were detained
pretrial for a short amount of time--between one and three days. However, as shown in column
ten of Table 6, all interviewees mentioned that they, or their families, faced some sort of
hardship as a result to their pretrial detention. Financial struggles and termination of employment
were the most commonly identified hardships. Other hardships included losing their house and
the inability to care for a child. These findings stress the need to consider how, even one day of
pretrial incarceration, can negatively impact a defendant’s employment status, finances, housing,
and family.
Risk score calculations revealed something interesting about this interview
group—their risk scores did not always make sense, and in one case, the score did not correlate
with legal requirements. For example, as shown on Table 6, two individuals were arrested for
misdemeanors--one for a violent misdemeanor, the other for a non-violent misdemeanor--yet
both individuals received the lowest risk score possible--a zero. If common sense were used, the
court would more likely have determined that releasing someone arrested for a violent offense
might pose more risk to the community than a person who was arrested for a non-violent offense.
This finding suggests that judicial discretion is needed to catch such discrepancies.
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Additionally, the Praxis recommendation can diverge from what is required by law. As
shown in columns three and four on Table 6, the Praxis recommended release for an individual
who was arrested for a DUI with a BAC greater than .15%, but the law requires mandatory
detention. The discrepancy in this case could be attributed to the fact that the VPRAI manual
directs pretrial officers to omit alcohol abuse when calculating the drug abuse category (Virginia
Department of Criminal Justice Services, 2018). This finding also suggests that judicial
discretion is needed to catch such discrepancies.
In this small sample, it was evident that the judge often followed the Praxis
recommendations, but he also exercised judicial discretion when necessary. As shown in column
three and four on Table 6, the judge followed the Praxis recommendation to release in all but one
case--the DUI case, where the Praxis recommended release, but the law required detention.
However, the judge did catch this discrepancy.
A final finding sheds more light on the early stages of the pretrial risk assessment process
when the pretrial officer questions the detained defendant. This exemplifies the vulnerable
position a defendant is placed in during the questioning process. Recall that during the
interviews, the interviewees were asked the same questions a pretrial services officer would have
asked them while they were detained. When the interviewees were asked, at the conclusion of
the interview, whether they remembered answering similar pretrial risk assessment questions,
only one interviewee remembered doing so, despite the fact they were all almost certainly asked
them the first day of detention. She also mentioned that she was not aware of the purpose of the
questioning, and assumed that the questions she answered while she was detained were meant to
determine her eligibility for a bail bondsman. This is significant because it demonstrates that the
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pretrial risk assessment is not being conducted in a manner that is transparent to the detained
defendant, which increases the defendant’s risk of self-incrimination. Interestingly, in the other
interview group, defense attorney #2 explained that this situation commonly occurs because
defendants do not have an attorney present when they are asked these questions and they are
either ignorant of how their answers might be used against them, or they are too preoccupied
with complying with authority, so they simply offer answers without considering the
consequences.
Discussion
Measuring the VPRAI in three distinct ways is the only way to determine its
effectiveness. The first way is to consider how professional stakeholders who use the VPRAI
view its utility. The second way is to consider how its use is furthering Virginia’s criminal
justice reform goals. The third way is to consider if it has any major flaws that would make it an
ineffective tool to measure risk.
Effectiveness of its Utility
First, data from the professional stakeholder group provides evidence that the VPRAI is
an effective tool for criminal justice professionals because of its utility. All of the professionals I
interviewed considered the VPRAI to be a useful tool for their own purposes and as a means for
communicating with other professional stakeholders. For example, the judge related that the
VPRAI pretrial report was an important and helpful component in his release decisions because
it summarizes everything he needs to consider at a bond hearing, which allows for a speedy but
thorough review. Similarly, the prosecutor stated that the VPRAI pretrial report helps him make
bond recommendations to the judge. Additionally, the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice
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Services official, whose job entails the oversight of the pretrial services budget, mentioned that
Praxis recommendations help conserve resources by targeting expenditures to the individuals
who need them most, and it even details the manner in which the resources should be used—
drug testing, trial reminders, check-ins--in order to maximize pretrial success rates. Further, both
defense attorneys mentioned that the VPRAI pretrial report provides them with a helpful
summary of their client’s history. Finally, both pretrial officers stated that the VPRAI helps them
calculate objective pretrial release and detention decisions. Based on testimony evidence from
the professionals whose work involves the VPRAI, it is indeed an effective pretrial tool when
measured by the utility it provides to criminal justice professionals. However, this does not
establish that the VPRAI is a comprehensively effective tool.
Effectiveness to Further Reform Goals
Virginia’s criminal justice reform efforts include lowering pretrial detention rates and
eliminating the use of cash bonds. It is believed that the VPRAI will help further these two goals
(Herring, 2018; Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, 2013), but does the evidence
support it? In order to determine if the VPRAI is an effective tool for lowering pretrial detention
rates and eliminating the use of cash bonds, we can consider the testimony evidence from the
former defendant group, analyze statistics on pretrial detention in Virginia from the Vera
Institute for Justice, and note findings on Virginia’s use of cash bond from the Virginia Crime
Commission.
Data from the former defendant group shows that the VPRAI is not being used early
enough in the pretrial process to lower pretrial detentions. All interviewees in this group stated
that they had been detained pretrial for at least a day, one for three days. However, at their bond
hearings, all but one of them were determined by the VPRAI, and the judge, to be of low risk and
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they were released. Had the risk assessment been conducted at the magistrate level, these
defendants would have been identified as low-risk from the start, and likely never detained
before their trial. Therefore, in order to truly stop unnecessary pretrial detentions, the VPRAI
must be used earlier on in the process, during the magistrate’s initial detention decision.
To be fair, this group of former defendants does not represent the whole; however, data
from the Vera Institute for Justice (2019) shows that pretrial detention in Virginia has not been
lowered by the use of the VPRAI. In fact, since its implementation, the number of detained
pretrial defendants has increased. When the VPRAI was implemented in 2005, there were almost
12,000 individuals detained pretrial in Virginia. The most recent figures available show that, by
2015, there were over 13,000 individuals detained in Virginia before their trial (Vera 2019). I
assert that the reason for this increase, and the reason for the former defendant group’s initial
detentions, was not due to the use of the VPRAI, but rather due to the fact that the VPRAI is not
being used at the magistrate level. In order for the VPRAI to be used as an effective tool to lower
pretrial detention rates, it must be used at the time the initial pretrial detention decision is made.
Data from the former defendants’ group also provides evidence that the VPRAI is not
being used to further efforts to eliminate the use of cash bonds. Recall that the VPRAI never
recommends cash bond as a condition for release, yet all of the former defendants who were
granted pretrial release had to pay a cash bond. Although this group is not a representative
sample of the whole, the trend is confirmed by a study from the Virginia Crime Commission
(2018), which found that in 2017, 62% of Virginia’s pretrial detainees who were granted release
with some level of pretrial supervision were also ordered to post a cash bond. This finding makes
it clear that, although the VPRAI never recommends the use of cash bonds, they are still
frequently used in conjunction with the non-monetary release conditions recommended by
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Praxis. Using the VPRAI in conjunction with cash bonds will not lower incarceration rates,
instead it will keep lower-income defendants unnecessarily detained. If the VPRAI is to be used
to help eliminate cash bond practices, then judicial officials must heed the VPRAI’s release
recommendations--and stop imposing monetary release conditions.
Based on the testimony evidence from former pretrial defendants and statistics from Vera
and the Virginia Crime Commission, the VPRAI is not being used as an effective tool for
helping further criminal justice reform goals. It has the potential to help lower incarcerations
rates and eliminate bail reform, but to contribute to these efforts it must be used earlier on by the
magistrate, and not in conjunction with cash bonds.
Effectiveness to Measure Risk
The final measure of effectiveness requires that the VPRAI be examined to uncover any
flaws that would make it an ineffective tool to measure risk. In order to determine this precisely,
a validation study would have to be conducted, which cannot be done until the VPRAI is opened
up for independent inquiry. However, we can analyze the qualitative data gathered in this study
and existing literature to identify potential problems with how the VPRAI measures risk.
Findings from this research cannot adequately establish whether the VPRAI is an
effective tool to measure risk. However, this research does offer anecdotal evidence that
illustrates, in some cases, the VPRAI has not produced risk scores that align with common sense
or legal requirements. For example, consider the two misdemeanor cases that were compared
previously, these serve as examples on how the VPRAI can assign risk scores that do not align
with common sense. Recall that the violent offender was given the same risk score as the nonviolent offender. Additionally, the DUI case mentioned previously serves as an example of how
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the VPRAI can fail to measure risk according to legal requirements. Recall that the risk score
aligned with a recommendation to release, which was contrary to legal requirements.
This research also offers anecdotal evidence that in some cases the VPRAI does not
adequately measure risk for drug and alcohol offenses. For example, interviews with professional
stakeholders revealed that they are concerned with how poorly the VPRAI considers risk for
drug charges and DUIs. Both the judge and a defense attorney expressed frustration that in drug
cases the VPRAI does not consider the risk individuals pose to themselves. Additionally, the
prosecutor expressed frustration that in DUI cases the VPRAI does not consider the risk
individuals pose to themselves, nor does it adequately calculate the danger they pose to society.
Together, these findings gleaned from interviews with professional stakeholders, suggest that in
many ways the VPRAI falls short of perfectly measuring risk.
An analysis of the existing literature on RAIs can also help identify potential problems
with how the VPRAI measures risk. Literature mentioned previously on RAIs establishes that
some factors are a poor measure of risk for certain groups. With this in mind, a careful review of
Luminosity’s race and gender-neutral study on the VPRAI reveals that two factors in particular
were not a good measure of risk for people of color or women. “Two or more violent
convictions” and “length of residency” were poor measures of risk because they tended to
produce risk scores that were too high for members of these groups (Danner, VanNostrand &
Spruance, 2016). While the “length of residency” factor was eventually dropped from the
VPRAI algorithm the “two or more violent convictions” factor remains. This suggests that the
VPRAI may not be adequately calculating risk for people of color or women because it still
considers this faulty risk factor. If true, this flaw would make in an ineffective tool to measure
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risk. However, no concrete conclusions on the VPRAI’s effectiveness at measuring risk can be
made until the VPRAI is opened for independent inquiry and validation.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
The VPRAI could be an effective tool to further criminal justice reform efforts in
Virginia if it were used earlier on in the pretrial process, not used in conjunction with cash bond,
and open to independent inquiry. An effort to modify the VPRAI would be worthwhile because it
seems to be an effective tool for criminal justice professionals and if perfected it would help
them accurately sort low-risk defendants for release and high-risk defendants for pretrial
detention. Professional stakeholders viewed the VPRAI as very useful, and cited clear examples
of how it helps them in their work. It simplifies decision making, helps direct resources, and
provides valuable information in a summarized format. However, the VPRAI falls short of being
effective in two important ways. First, at the present time, the VPRAI is not effectively
contributing to reform efforts because it is not being used early enough in the pretrial process to
avoid detentions, and it is being used in conjunction with cash bonds. Additionally, it is
impossible to prove that the VPRAI is an effective tool to measure risk because it is not open to
independent inquiry. Although the VPRAI falls short of being an all-around effective tool, I
conclude that with some modifications the VPRAI could help further criminal justice reform
efforts and produce unbiased risk assessments. Below I propose several policy modifications that
could improve the use of the VPRAI as a tool to lower incarceration rates, eliminate cash bond,
and produce unbiased pretrial detention decisions.
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Policy Recommendations
The first policy recommendation is for the VPRAI to be used at the magistrate level. The
VPRAI can help magistrates more accurately identify who needs to be detained. This change
could help eliminate unnecessary pretrial detentions and in turn lower incarceration rates. Other
criminal justice professionals already appreciate the VPRAI’s utility and likely magistrates
would readily adopt it too.
Additionally, this policy modification has a small price tag that would be offset by
pretrial detention reduction. While there would be a cost associated with training magistrates on
the VPRAI and additional pretrial officers would be needed to conduct round-the-clock
investigations, there should not be any additional costs associated with the change. In fact,
overall this modification would result in cost savings because using the VPRAI at the magistrate
level would help to lower unnecessary pretrial incarcerations from the beginning of the pretrial
process.
The second policy recommendation is to eliminate the practice of cash bonds through
state legislation. So far, the VPRAI has not been used to further this reform goal, therefore the
practice must be ended through legislation. This would force judicial officials to solely rely on
the Praxis recommendation for pretrial services. These services are beneficial to pretrial
defendants because they increase the likelihood that they will show up for trial and remain on
good behavior. The practice of cash bond offers no such support.
Further, this policy recommendation has more challenges than the first. For example, the
bail bond industry will fight against the change. Legislators will have to overcome the industry’s
influence. Moreover, the financial consequences associated with cash bond elimination should be
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studied. However, it is beyond the scope of this research to calculate how the elimination of cash
bond might impact the finances of the Commonwealth, or to formulate a plan to pass legislation.
Finally, independent studies must be conducted on the VPRAI in order to ensure that it is
producing unbiased risk calculations and accurate release recommendations. We cannot rely on a
for-profit company to find flaws with its own algorithm. Independent researchers would not shy
away from finding and disclosing shortcomings, and this would improve the VPRAI by
highlighting areas in need of correction and providing some much needed pressure on
Luminosity to make changes. More importantly, independent inquiry is needed because
professional stakeholders and the public must have a reliable account of the outcomes produced
by the VPRAI. Until there is an independent validation study, we cannot be certain that accurate
data is being used to detain individuals.
Together these three policy recommendations could improve the pretrial process and
promote pretrial justice. If the VPRAI were improved through independent research and used at
the magistrate level--without cash bond--it would be an all-around effective tool to further
Virginia’s pretrial reform efforts. These policy modifications would help criminal justice
professional accurately identify defendants for detention based on risk and lower costly
detentions. Further, these improvements would ensure that pretrial justice in Virginia is equal for
all and not exacerbating preexisting criminal justice biases through the use of inaccurate
algorithms or flawed data.
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Pretrial Process in Virginia
Table 1
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Professional Stakeholders’ Answers Organized by Theme

Table 2
Professional
Stakeholder
Identified by
Role

DCJS Official

Benefits

It is evidenced- based and
validated
Provides an objective
measure of risk, roots out
subjective bias

Challenges

Too much restriction
can be harmful, we
must be making
correct decisions

Consequences

Need to keep
monitoring and
studying
outcomes

Suggested
Improvements

Factoring conviction
is better than
factoring in arrest

Generally Concerns on
Supports bias outcomes
Use of
VPRAI
and
Praxis
Yes

Should be
mindful

Yes

No

Make process faster
33 pretrial services
agencies to monitor

Consider the PSA
RAI when
contemplating
improvements

Risk assessment
instruments can further
the goal of cash bond
elimination

Keep studying and
improving

Praxis can save resources
by identifying those who
do not need pretrial
services or detention

Consider replacing
recommendation to
detain with the
word “caution”

Praxis can mitigate FTA risk

Consider domestic
violence and mental
health
Be more precise on
what we mean by
“public safety”

Judge

Very important and helpful
component in release
decisions
Condenses lots of
important information for
quick review
Neutral party doing
assessment

Hard to quantify
human behavior
Judges must be
mindful of unwise
release
recommendations

Pretrial services
has become
good at assessing
people and
highlighting
discrepancies
Allows for good
collaboration
between judge

Provide
professional
education
For drug abuse we
must consider the
risk of release to
the person.
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Praxis helps keep released
defendants out of trouble
Prosecutor

and pretrial
services

Helpful for bond
recommendation

Must aid bond
decision, not control

Good measure of FTA

Human discretion is
still needed

Tool sometimes
recommends
improper release

Include factors for
DWI, nature of
offense,

Yes

No

Geared more for
prosecutor’s
benefit than
defendants

Consider time in
community

Yes

No

Yes

No

Must have good
pretrial agency, they
are not all the same
Not good measure of
someone committing
another crime
Defense Attorney
1

Good informational tool
for all parties at bond
hearing

Magistrates don’t
use the risk
assessment tool.
They consider
recommendations
from arresting
officers.

Doesn’t consider
mitigating factors

Distinguish between
property and
violent crime
Include substance
abuse treatment
history

Defense Attorney
2

Provides helpful summary
of defendant’s history
It’s a confidential
document

Uncertainty
concerning how
recommendations
are calculated
Judge often
overrides release
recommendations

Increases
defendant’s risk
of selfincrimination

Training needs to
be offered to
attorneys
The more its
studied, the more
we can learn how to
improve it
Differentiate
between types of
criminal convictions
& charges
Differentiate
between types of
violent crimes
Consider risk to self
in drug cases
Should not
consider
employment status
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Virginia Delegate
& Public
Defender

Takes subjectivity out of
decision making-process.
Praxis can help ensure
defendants are successful
on pretrial release.
Safer decisions made
based on risk and not on
how much money
someone can pay

Magistrate’s pretrial
decisions must be
overcome, excessive
bond often initially
imposed.

Increase
likelihood of
pretrial
detention for
minorities due to
over policing.

Pretrial officers do
not consistently
follow Praxis
recommendation.

Pretrial Officer 2

helped move risk
assessments from
subjective to objective

Crime Commission
just catching up on
VPRAI

Furthers goal to eliminate
cash bond

We have to
remember detention
should be a last
resort

Improves public safety and
appearance rates
Allows pretrial services to
objectively calculate risk
and recommend bond
It’s evidence-based and
validated

Hard to factor in
mental health issues

Yes

Yes

Mitigating factors to
consider: mental
illness, time in
community,
children in school
Praxis could include
text messaging as a
pretrial services
method

FTA is easier to
predict than whether
someone will break
the law

Pretrial Officer 1

Consider mitigating
factors such as
community ties
Count FTAs only if
they are actual
convictions

None

Keep studying and
tweaking as needed

Yes

No

Release of lowrisk defendants
lowers their risk
of recidivism,
and makes them
less likely to
plead

Consider weighing
drug use differently
depending on type
of drug

Yes

No

Improve
constituency
awareness of VPRAI
Keep studying and
improving as
needed
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Chart for Initial Calculation
Table 3

Source: Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services. 2018. VPRAI Manual.

Chart for Secondary Calculation
Table 4

Source: Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services. 2018. VPRAI Manual.
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Praxis Chart to Calculate Detention Recommendation and Steps for Risk
Mitigation
Table 5
Source: Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services. 2018. VPRAI Manual.
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Analysis of Answers from Former Defendants
Table 6
Former
Defendant(FD)
Identified by
Number and
Most Serious
Charge

Risk
Score*

Was
Released
Before
Trial

VPRAI
Recommend
ation
Followed?

Recalls
Answering
Pretrial
Questions

Cash Bail
a
Condition
of Release

Pretrial
Services a
Condition of
Release

Number
of Days
Detained
Before
Trial

Praxis
Recommen
dation
Followed?*

FD1
Felony Theft

9

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

1

Yes

FD2
Violent
Misdemeanor
FD3
Non-Violent
Misdemeanor
FD4
Felony Theft
FD5
1st time
Misdemeanor DUI
>0.15%

0

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

1

Yes

0

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

1

Yes

9

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

3

Yes

0

No

No- law
required
mandatory time

No

N/A

N/A

2

No

Hardships
Related to
Pretrial
Detention

Job Loss, Financial
Problems, Housing
Loss, Inability to
care for child
Financial hardship

Inability to provide
for child, Financial
hardship
Job loss, Financial
hardship
Financial hardship
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Appendix
List of Interviewees from the Professional Stakeholder Group
1. Virginia Delegate and public defender, Jennifer Carroll Foy
2. Stafford County Commonwealth Attorney, Eric Olsen
3. Fredericksburg area defense attorney #1, confidentiality requested
4. Fredericksburg area defense attorney #2, Stacey Garcia
5. Rappahannock Regional Jail Pretrial Services officer #1, confidentiality requested
6. Rappahannock Regional Jail Pretrial Services officer #2, confidentiality requested
7. Stafford County judge, J. Bruce Strickland
8. Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services official, confidentiality requested

Professional stakeholders who declined to be interviewed:
1. Virginia State Crime Commission Executive Director, Kristen J. Howard
2. Old Dominion University professor and co-author of Luminosity’s VPRAI validation study,
Monna Danner
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Appendix
Interview Questions for Professional Stakeholder Group
Question 1: How do pretrial risk assessments, or pretrial risk assessment tools, impact your
work?
Question 2: Do you believe the use of the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument
(VPRAI), and related Praxis risk recommendation instrument improves justice in Virginia? Why
or why not?
Question 3: Do you have any concerns about the implementation, use, or outcomes produced by
VPRAI or Praxis?
Question 4: To your knowledge, have other professionals brought up concerns about VPRAI,
Praxis or similar risk calculation and mitigation instruments? What are those concerns?
Questions 5: Do you believe that the 8 pretrial risk factors collected for VPRAI are good
measures of risk? Why or why not?
For reference, the 8 factors are, at the time of arrest, the individual:
1. Is on active community criminal justice supervision
2. Currently being charged for felony drug, theft, or fraud
3. Has a pending charge
4. Has one or more adult criminal convictions
5. Has two or more failures to appear
6. Has two or more violent convictions
7. Is unemployed
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8. Has a history of drug abuse

Question 6: In your opinion, what other factors should be used to determine whether a pretrial
defendant would show up for court and remain on good behavior?
Question 7: Are you aware of any concerns that the VPRAI or Praxis may be unintentionally
biased against groups of people or in some other way flawed?
Question 8: Has the use of VPRAI and Praxis made Virginia safer?
Question 9: Do you believe that the use and implementation of VPRAI and Praxis must be
studied further? Why? What could we learn? What should we learn?
Question 10: Thinking about pretrial risk assessment tools in general, are there any additional
comments you would like to make?
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Appendix
Interview Questions for Former Defendant Group
To begin, think about a time in your past in which you were arrested and waited in jail for a court
appearance. Answer the following questions based off of that resolved incident.
In what year did the arrest take place? _________
Mark all the charges that applied to your arrest:
(Answers can be marked by either highlighting text, placing an “X” near the term, or writing a
comment.)


Violent Felony



Violent Firearm



Violent Misdemeanor



Non-Violent Felony



Driving Under the Influence



Non-Violent Misdemeanor



Failure to Appear



Unsure

If Failure to Appear was a charge, please select the charge you were supposed to appear for:
o

Violent Felony

o

Violent Firearm

o

Violent Misdemeanor

o

Non-Violent Felony

o

Driving Under the Influence
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o

Non-Violent Misdemeanor

o

Unsure

Now, please answer the questions in the box below based on how you would have likely answered
these same questions at the time of your arrest. (Answers can be marked by either highlighting text,
placing an “X” near the term, or writing a comment.)

Question 1

Question 2

Question 3

Question 4

Question 5

Question 6

Question 7

Question 8

At the time of arrest,
were you on active
criminal justice
supervision?
Was your arrest for
felony drug, felony
theft, or felony fraud?
At the time of arrest,
did you have any
pending charges?
At the time of arrest,
did you have one or
more adult criminal
convictions?
At the time of arrest,
did you have two or
more failures to
appear?
At the time of arrest,
did you have two or
more violent
convictions?
At the time of arrest,
were you unemployed?
At the time of arrest,
did you have a history
of drug abuse?

Other response or comment:
Yes

Yes

No

No
No

Yes

I would not have
known how to
answer.
I would not have
known how to
answer.
I would not have
known how to
answer.
I would not have
known how to
answer.

Other response or comment:

Other response or comment:

Yes

No

Other response or comment:

Yes

No

I would not have
known how to
answer.

Other response or comment:

Yes

No

I would not have
known how to
answer.

Other response or comment:

Yes

No

Other response or comment:

Yes

No

I would not have
known how to
answer.
I would not have
known how to
answer.

Other response or comment:

In the following sections, answers can be marked by either highlighting text, placing an “X” near the
term, or writing a comment.
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Question 9: When you were detained in jail, do you remember someone asking you similar questions to
Yes

No

Do not recall

those listed above?

Question 10: Did a judge grant you pretrial release? (Pretrial release means you were allowed to leave
jail before your trial.)
Yes

No

Unsure

Question 11: Did you leave jail before your trial?
Yes, shortly after my
release was allowed.

Yes, eventually, but only after a
delay of more than two days.

No, I did not leave jail before
my trial.

Question 12: If you were given pretrial release, (allowed to leave jail before your trial), were there any
terms associated?
No terms to
comply with

Cash Bond

Released on
own
recognizance
(signature)

Check in with
Pretrial
Services

Drug Test

Other:

Question 13: If you were given pretrial release, were you able to meet the terms of your release?
Yes

No

Does Not Apply

Other:

Question 13: Did being detained in jail before your trial cause you, or anyone you consider as close
family, to suffer any hardship? Mark all that apply, and elaborate if you desire. Please do not include
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hardships that came about while serving a sentence. Answers can be marked by either highlighting text,
placing an “X” near the term, or writing a comment.
Hardships that affected you due to incarceration before
trial:

Hardships that affected someone you would
consider as close family, due to your
incarceration before trial:

Financial problems
Job loss
Vehicle repossession
Housing loss
Physical health decline
Mental health decline
Inability to provide care for a child
Inability to provide care for an adult
School absences
Lost custody of child

Financial problems
Job loss
Vehicle repossession
Housing loss
Physical health decline
Mental health decline
Inability to provide care for a child
Inability to provide care for an adult
School absences
Lost custody of child

Other, please feel free to elaborate:

Other, please feel free to elaborate:

